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“Lone Female Headship and Welfare Policy in Canada”
The principal  qualifying condition for welfare in Canada, unlike the US, is financial need - there are
n o demographic criteria.  We use a time- series of annual, national cross-sections for the period 1981
through  1 993 to estimate a model of lone-female headship.  Our findings do not support th e
hypothesis  that welfare benefit levels for one-parent and two-parent families are importan t
d eterminants of the likelihood that a Canadian woman is a lone mot her.   In all models with provincial
f ixed effects, the coeffici ents for welfare benefits are small, statistically insignificant and often of the
unexpected  sign.   We do find that the probability that a woman is a lone mother is generall y
associat ed  in the expected fashion with her earnings capacity and the earnings capacity of he r
potential male partner, and with her age and schooling.3
I.  Introduction
A considerable U.S. lite rature has evolved concerning the association between the incidence
of  lon e female headship among families with children and welfare policy, specifically the level o f
benefits  available from AFDC, Medicaid and Food Stamps.   A consensus, however, has yet t o
e merge.  A strong, p ositive association between the state level of welfare benefits and the incidence
o f lone motherhood has been found in single cross-s ections (Moffitt 1991 and Schultz 1994), but not
i n a time-series of cross-sections (Moffitt 1994).   Evidence from the Seattle-Denver Experiments has
a lso been subject to v arying interpretations (Hannan and Tuma 1990 and Cain and Wissoker 1993).
Canada  prov ides interesting similarities and contrasts with the U.S.   The followin g
phenomena   have been true of both countries during the recent past.  Lone-mother  families are the
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g roup most reliant on welfare inco me save for the disabled.   The proportion of all children who live
in  lone-mo ther families and the proportion of poor children who live in lone-mother families hav e
incr eased.   Earnings inequality has increased and the earnings of low skill workers have bee n
especi ally  weak.  The cost of welfare is shared by the federal and state/provincial levels o f
government.   Real benefit levels vary considerably by state and province. 
There are also major differences betw een the two countries.  First, there are no demographic
c riteria for welfare in Canada.  The mai n qualifying condition in all provinces has been financial need
since the late 1960's.  As we show below, the welfare participation rates of employable adults who
are  not sol e-support parents has been quite low historically, but there were noticeable increase s
d uring the early 1990's.   A second difference is that real welfare be nefit levels are considerably higher4
i n Canada (Blank and Hanratty 1992) and rose by about  20 per cent during the period 1981-1993 for
all categories of clients including lone mothers, married couples and singles. 
Welfare policy has been high on the Canadian policy agenda recently, but  there have been only
four  studi es of the relationship between welfare policy and the incidence of lone-female headship ,
none  of which offers definitive conclusions.  In this paper, we  use a time-series of annual, national
c ross-se ctions for the period 1981 through 1993 to estimate a model of lone female headship.  Our
f ocus will be on, though the scope of the pape r not limited to, two sets of possible determinants:  (1)
t he level of welfare benefits for lone parents and for couples w ith children; and (2) the level of market
wage s  for women and men.  Our approach blends the strengths of two recent U.S. studies.  Lik e
Moffitt (1994), we see i f the positive association between welfare benefits and the incidence of lone
f emale headship, whi ch has been found in single U.S. cross-sections and was found by Allen (1993)
in  a  single Canadian cross-section, persists in a time-series of cross-sections with provincial fixe d
e ffects.  Like Schultz (1994), we estimate the impact of female wages and  the wages of potential male
partners for all women in our sample. 
S ection II of the paper contains a brief review of the Canadian welfare  system and the relevant
l iterature.  Our data and descriptive statistics ar e discussed in Section III.   In Section IV, we present
e stimates of a probit model f or the conditional likelihood that a woman is lone head of a family with
child ren  less than 18 along with the results of informal sensitivity tests of our findings.  Section  V
provides a summary and conclusion.5
II.   Review of the Canadian Welfare System and Literature 
      
Welfare in Canada is a provincia l responsibility, but the federal government assumed 50% of
t he program costs in 1967.  This arrangement changed in 1989 wh en the federal government imposed
a  maximum of 5% on the annual gro wth rate of federal welfare transfers to the three highest income
prov inces  (Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia) which together account for over 50% of th e
p opulation. This had an espec ially sharp impact in Ontario which was much more adversely affected
by  the r ecession of the early 1990's than were Alberta and British Columbia.  In return for cost -
s haring,  the federal government imposed the following three conditions on provincial policy during
our  data period:  financial need was the principal qualification for welfare; provincial residenc y
r equirements were f orbidden; and there had to be an appeals process.    Provinces had the freedom,
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h owever, to set the level  of welfare payments and there has always been considerable variation both
b etween provinces and over time  in the benefit schedules.   Indeed, the relative ranking of provinces
by benefit level changed considerably during our sample period.  
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Lone mothers and the di sabled have always been quite reliant on welfare income and remain
so  today .  The same was once true of the elderly but the welfare participation rate of seniors ha s
d eclined steadily over the past two decades as other income support progr ams for this age group have
e xpanded.  As shown i n Section III, the welfare participation rates of other groups, such as couples
and unattached individuals has grown somewhat. 
There  ar e only four Canadian studies which address directly the topic of this paper. Alle n
(1993)  used  the 1986 Census public use sample and found a large and significantly positive impact
o f the level of provincial welfare benefits on the probability that a woman  is a lone mother.  There are,6
h owever,  severa l reasons to interpret this result with caution.  One is that Allen’s model contains a
v ery limited set of variables and he performs few sensitivity tests of how  well his results hold up under
a lternative specifications.  A sec ond reason for caution arises from Moffit’s research with U.S. data.
When  Moffit t (1991) used a single cross section, he found, as have others, a positive associatio n
b etween the state level of welfare (AFDC) benefits  and the likelihood that a women is a lone mother.
I n a more recent paper, however, Moffitt  (1994) used a time-series of U.S. cross-sections and found
that  this  association is extremely weak and non-existent in the presence of a fixed effect for eac h
stat e.   He concludes that the welfare benefit effect estimated in single cross-sections may largel y
reflect  the fact that states which are more tolerant of lone mothers have both (1) more adequat e
welfare ben efits and (2) more lone mothers due to a less stigmatizing atmosphere.  A major goal of
t he  current paper is to apply Moffitt’s test to Allen’s finding using a time-series of Canadian cross-
sections. 
A second C anadian study used data from the Canadian Mincome Experiment, the principa l
purpose  of which was to study the impact of a negative income tax on market work.  Hum an d
Choudhry (1992) estimated the as sociation between the generosity of a negative income tax plan and
marital  stability during the three years of the experiment.   Their estimates were quite imprecise due
to small sample size a nd even their qualitative findings are not readily interpretable.  They found that
both families with the least generou s plans and families with the most generous plans had more stable
marriages  than did families with plans of medium generosity.   Studies of marital stability using NIT
Expe rimental data from the U.S. have also yielded mixed results (see Hannan and Tuma (1990) and
Cain and Wissoker (1993)).7
Lef ebvre and Merrigan have used retrospective, family-history data from Statistics Canada's
1990  Gen eral Social Survey in two recent papers.  This survey contains no wage or incom e
information  so they use aggregate means of female wages and male income by  age and year from a
different data source.  In  the first paper (1997), they estimate a hazard function for the dissolution of
first (registered or common-law) ma rriages and obtain a non-significant effect for the level of welfare
benefi ts  for lone parents.  The female wage effect is significantly positive (higher hazard, shorte r
marital   duration) as expected, but only for the younger cohort of women.  Male income has  a
significantly negative coefficient for all cohorts.  
In the second paper (1998), Lefebvre and Merrigan  estimate a hazard function for exiting lone
motherh ood via (first) marriage or remarriage.  This data set includes welfare benefit levels for both
lone  m others and couples, and these variables have significantly negative (lower hazard, longe r
unmarried spell) and positive coefficients res pectively.  They do not, however, find a significant effect
fo r  women’s wages or male income. The estimated quantitative impacts of welfare benefits ar e
sub stantial.  A ten per cent increase in the benefits for a single parent lengthens the median duration
of  the spell of lone  motherhood by  a one year.  This effect is larger for never married lone mothers
than for previously married ones.  Hence, these authors arrive at qu ite different estimates of the impact
of  welfare bene fits and market wages for married spells than for unmarried spells.   Eventually th e
Survey  of Labour  Income and Dynamics will permit much better data for the study of the dynamics
o f  marriage, divorce and remarriage in Canada but this longitudinal survey in still in its early waves.8
III.   Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data are drawn from the public use files of the Survey of Consumer Fina nces (SCF) which
i s the Canadian equivalent of the U.S. M arch Current Population Survey.   There are separate public
use  files for economic families and for  individuals.  Statistics Canada’s  definition of an “economic
f amily”  is the same as the U.S.  Census Bureau’s definition of a “family”, namely, all related persons
who live in the same household.  (An  unattached individual is the head of a one-person family.)  The
economic  family files begin in 1973, but they contain individual information only for the head an d
s pouse of the head.  A sizable propo rtion of Canadian women are neither the head nor the spouse of
the  head of an economic family.  This  proportion reaches 50 per cent among women under age 25
which is a key age g roup for our study.   Hence, we have relied primarily on the SCF public use file
f or all individuals  which begins only in 1981.  Specifically, the estimates reported in this paper were
o btained with the SCF Individu al Public Use Files for the years 1981, 1982 and 1984 through 1993.
(There  is none for 1983.)  We do report, however, on estimates obtained with a sample of femal e
heads  and spouses of heads age 25 and over from the economic files for 1973  through 1993.  The
missing data problem is least severe for this age group in the economic family files. 
An important data issue is the definition of a lone mother.  S tatistics Canada defines a “census
family”  as one  which includes only an unattached individual, or a married couple or a lone paren t
a long with any never-married children.  Hence, an economic family may cont ain more than one census
f amily.  The head of a “prim ary census family” is also the head of the economic family.  The head of
a  “secondary census famil y” is not the head of the economic family.   In the terminology of the U.S.
Census  Bureau, primary census family heads correspond to “family heads” and secondary censu s9
family  heads correspond to “subfamily heads”.  The estimates in the tables below  are based on the
larger  sample of  all lone mothers with a child under 18.  As a sensitivity test, we also report o n
e stimates obtained with the somewhat smaller sample of those lo ne mothers who are economic family
hea ds.   F inally, we follow Statistics Canada and use the term married couple to refer to bot h
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registered and common-law unions. 
Tables   1 through 5 provide descriptive data concerning Canadian lone mothers and othe r
v ariables relevant for thi s paper. The top panel of Table 1 shows that the proportion of all Canadian
women  who are lone mothers was 6%-7% over our sample perio d.  Moffitt (1994, Table A1) reports
c omparable headship ra tes of 6.7% and 8.5% for U.S. white women in 1978 and 1988 respectively.
The marked stability in the Ca nadian figures contrasts with the sometimes encountered image in our
p opular media of steady growth  in the prevalence of lone motherhood.  This popular image is better
reflected   in the middle panel of Table 1 which demonstrates an increase in the proportion of al l
mo thers  (of children under 18) who are lone mothers.  This is especially true of mothers under age
2 5 over one third of whom were lo ne heads by 1993.  The reason for the difference between the top
two  pane ls is the decline (not shown here) in the likelihood that a Canadian woman is a marrie d
mother (Dooley 1995).
The  bottom  panel of Table 1 demonstrates that the proportion of lone mothers who hea d
e cono mic families (rather than “subfamilies”) has also been relatively stable over the sample period
i n all age groups.  An interesting q uestion for our future research is what are the determinants of the
likelihood that a Canadian lone mother lives on her own, that is, heads an economic family.
The top two panels  of Table 2 show the age distribution of  lone mothers and of all women.
The  proportion of both groups under age 25 was falling.  The proportion of both groups age 25 to10
44  was i ncreasing as the peak baby boom cohorts moved into this age range during our sampl e
period.    There is a difference between the panels for the oldest a ge group.  The proportion age 45-59
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was falling among lone mothe rs but not in the general population.  The former reflects the cessation
of childbearing at an increasingly early age in Canada. 
The  bottom p anel of Table 2 shows that the proportion of lone mothers who have neve r
married  (registered or common-law) increased, especially among those under age 35.  This is als o
t rue of the U.S. (Moffitt 1992).   I n the next section, we do not estimate separate models for marital
a nd child status as did Schultz (1994).  Instead, we foll ow Moffit (1994) and estimate the conditional
p robability of lone motherhood among all women.  As a sensitivity tes t, however, we did estimate our
b asic probit  model using a sample restricted to ever-married women and we report on those results
b el ow.  A more detailed analysis of the different avenues by which women enter into and exit from
the  s tatus of lone motherhood, and the relation of socioeconomic variables to such transitions ,
certainly merits further study. This objective is beyond the reach of our current efforts. 
Table  3 provides information concerning welfare participation.  Detailed national caseloa d
d ata are not collected and published in Canada.  The only indicator of wel fare participation in the SCF
is  the propor tion of persons reporting any social assistance income during a given year.  Welfar e
income  is known to be under-reported on the SCF which would, on the one hand, lead th e
p roportions in Tab le 3 to be underestimates of the monthly welfare participation rate.  On the other
ha nd,  the SCF proportions are based on annual income and, on that basis alone, would tend t o
overe stimate  the monthly welfare participation rate.   The top panel of Table 3 shows that th e
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proportion  of lone mothers reporting welfare  income increased from 38% to 44% over the sample
period  and that this increase was larger among those under age 35.   Moffitt (1992) reports AFDC11
p arti cipation rates of 42%-44% for U.S. lone mothers in 1985-1987.  The middle panel shows that
a  sm all proportion of Canadian couples with children do report social assistance income.  The only
noticeable  tren d for this group was the increase from 5% to 10% in this fraction of  the younges t
c ouples reporting welfare income.  This r eflects the unusually severe impact that the recession of the
early 1990's had on young workers. 
The bottom pa nel of Table 3 shows the welfare use among unmarried, childless women and
ind icates,  perhaps surprisingly, that those age 16-25 have the lowest and most stable participatio n
rates.   Thi s age pattern can be explained by two facts.  First, we have included women attendin g
s chool in our sample because they constitute such  a large proportion of the population at risk of lone
motherhood in the  youngest age group. Were we to exclude students, the welfare participation rate
amo ng  single, childless women age 16-25 would increase from about 8% to 13% over the sampl e
p eriod.  Second, the relatively high welfare participation rate amo ng unmarried, childless women over
age 34 may well reflect the incidence of poor health and disability in this group.
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Our multivariate analysis will focus on the impact of market wages and we lfare benefits.   Like
Schultz  (1994), we include measures of earnings capacity for each woman and for her potentia l
( male) partner in our pr obit models for the likelihood of lone motherhood.  These variables serve as
indicators  of the  ability of a woman to support a family via her own earnings and the ability of  a
potential  mate  to provide an adequate level of economic support for a spouse and children.  Th e
standard  e conomic hypotheses are that the likelihood of lone motherhood would be positivel y
a ssociated with the  level of earnings capacity for women and negatively associated with the level of
earni ngs  capacity for potential partners.  For women in particular, it is important that we measur e
earnings  c apacity and not actual earnings because a change in marital or child status is sometime s12
a ccompanied  by a change in hours and weeks of market work.  Hence, the currently observed level
o f annual or weekly earnings for an individua l may be a poor indicator of what her earnings potential
would be were she to change marital or child status.
We  use three indicators of earnings capacity for women:  hourly wages; weekly earnings in
a  full-time job; and annual earnings in a  full year (48-52 weeks), full-time job.    Each measure has
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a dvan tages and disadvantages.  In principle, the hourly wage is least influenced by hours of market
work, but the only hourly measure available from the SCF i s derived using annual weeks of work and
e arnings from the year prior to the survey and the  weekly hours of work from the survey week.  This
p oses a particular problem for women because they are m ore likely than men to change weekly hours
of  market work  from year to year.  The disadvantage of our annual earnings measure is that it i s
l imited to women who worked 48-52 weeks in the year prior to the su rvey.  Therefore, the estimating
sample  for this measure is the smallest of the three measures and may be subject to the greates t
selection  bi as.  Fortunately, the three measures of earnings capacity all provide similar probi t
e stimates.  In the tables that follow, we  report the results for full-time weekly earnings and comment
on the infrequent instances in which the two other measures yield different conclusions. 
The top panel of Table 4 presents the trends in full-time weekly earnings  for women.  We find,
as  did Morissette et. al. (1994), that there was a  growing gap between younger and older workers
o ver the sample period.  Full-time weekly earnings among w omen under 35 were unchanged whereas
there  was modest growth of 8%  and 12% for women age 35-44 and 45-59 respectively.  Potential
e arnings had to be imputed for the women who did no paid work  during the survey year and standard
tec hniques  (Heckman 1987) were used for this purpose.  Table 2-A in the Appendix contains th e
sel ection-corrected,  regression estimates for the full-time weekly earnings of women.  Identifyin g13
re strictions  for wage effects are usually a matter of judgement in studies of labour supply, welfar e
parti cipation  and headship.  We have included the provincial unemployment rate and a dumm y
v ariable for urban residence in the wage  regression but not in the conditional probability function for
female  headsh ip.  As shown below, the imputed values of female earnings and the earnings of th e
p ot ential male partner are both functions of the same set of variables, i.e., the characteristics of the
woman and the local labour mark et.  Therefore, exclusion of both the unemployment rate and urban
residence from the headship probit are needed to identify the two wage effects. 
Estimating  the earnings capacity of each woman’s potential partner requires a sample o f
c ouples with ear nings information for both spouses.   For this purpose, we used the SCF public use
file  for economic families.  This file contains two indicators of the husbands’ earnings capacity :
weekly  e arnings in a full-time job and annual earnings in a full-year, full-time job.   Informatio n
concerning  h ourly wages and weekly hours of work are not available.  (We do report below ,
however, on estimates obtained with just annual earnings for males.) 
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows that the gap in full-time weekly  earnings between younger
a nd older workers grew wider for men  just as it did for women but for a different  reason.  Full-time
weekly earnings declined by 5% for men under age 35 and there was  only a slight change for men age
3 5- 59.   As a result of the wage trends for both women and men, the gender pay gap shrank.  Full-
tim e  weekly earnings for women were 65% of those for men in 1981-85 and this fraction grew t o
7 0% by 1990-93.  We regressed ea ch measure of the husband’s earnings (weekly and annual) on his
wife’s  age and schooling, the provincial unemployment rate, and a series of dummies for year ,
province  and urban residence.  The resulting coefficients were  then used to predict the earnings of
a potential male partner for each woman in the SCF public use file for individuals.  14
Th e  second set of independent variables of particular interest in our multivariate analysi s
contains  the level of welfare benefits for lone parents and for couples with children.   The standard
e c onomic hypothesis is that the likelihood of lone motherhood would be positively associated with
t he former an d negatively associated with the latter.  The welfare benefit data comes from a variety
of  so urces including the provincial gazettes, Federal-Provincial Working Party on Incom e
Maintenance (1975), Banting (1982) and the Nati onal Council of Welfare (1987, 1989, 1990, 1992).
Welfare benefit s vary over time, among provinces and by family size within provinces.   For
our  probit mode l, we must select the (potential) benefit levels for families of a given size becaus e
many  of  the women in our sample are childless.  In the estimates reported in the tables below, w e
u sed the benefits available to a lone  parent with two children and to a couple with two children.  We
f ound little differen ce in the results when our models were estimated with the benefits available to a
lone parent with one child and to a couple with one child. 
The  top  panel of Table 5 presents the average (weighted by population) weekly values o f
t hese measures.  How do these compare with U.S. welfare rates?  Moffitt ( 1992, Table 3) reports that
monthly  AFDC benefits for a family of four averaged US$395 in 1982 dollars between 1981 an d
1 985.  He also report values for the sum of 70%  of AFDC plus Food Stamps plus Medicaid benefits.
Pu blic  health insurance is universal in Canada and, for comparison purposes therefore, we hav e
e xcluded the value of Medicaid from this U.S. benefit package.  Th e sum of 70% of AFDC plus Food
Stamps has an average value of US$511 between  1981 and 1981. 
F or purposes  of comparison, we have adjusted the Canadian figures in 1981-1985 from our
Table 5 as follows:  conver sion to a monthly basis - multiplied by 4.33; conversion to 1982 dollars -
 mult iplied by 0.84; conversion to U.S. dollars - multiplied by 0.75; and, in the case of the lon e15
p arents, ad ditional benefit for a third child - multiplied by 1.10.  This yields a value of $622 for one
p arent with three children and $625 for a couple with tw o children.  Hence, U.S. cash transfers in the
early  1980's w ere 64% (=395/622) of Canada welfare benefits and the sum of AFDC plus Foo d
Stamps was equal to 82% (=511/622) of the value of Canadian benefits.  
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What happened to Canadian welf are benefits over our sample period?  Table 5 indicates that
t hese grew by 17%-18%  for each type of family.  There was no change in the average benefits for a
lo ne  parent  relative  to those for a couple.  Moffit’s benefit data for the U.S. stop at 1987 but th e
i ndication from his figure s is that the U.S. trend in welfare benefits was either downwards or at best
constant  at that point.  Hence, it is  likely that gap between Canada and the U.S. grew even further
o ver our sample period.  See Blank and Hanratty (1992,  1993) for more a detailed comparison of the
U.S. and Canadian welfare systems. 
Ho w did Canadian welfare benefits change relative to market earnings opportunities? Th e
b ottom panel of Table 5 shows tha t the benefit for lone parents grew relative to the full-time weekly
e arnings of women and  that the benefit for couples grew relative to the full-time weekly earnings of
me n.  The increase in this ratio (welfare/earnings) was especially true for younger lone parents and
c ouples.  It was also somewhat stronger for  couples than for lone parents which reflects the fact that
the  earnings of women grew relative to the earnings of men in Table 4.  Moffitt (1992, Table 3 )
i ndicates that ther e was a slight decline in this same ratio for the U.S. during the period 1981-1986.
Dooley (1996)  analyses changes in the welfare participation rates of Canadian lone mothers
between  1973  and 1991.  Social assistance use by lone mothers under age 35 grew steadily and  a
su bstantial  proportion of this growth can be accounted for by the increase in the value of welfar e
b enefits relative to the potential earni ngs of this group.   In contrast, the welfare participation rate of16
lone  mot hers age 35 and over changed little which is consistent with the fact that the potentia l
earnings of this age group grew at the same rate as welfare benefits. 
IV.   Probit Estimates
We estimated a  wide variety of probit models for the incidence of lone parenthood.  W e
foll ow  Moffitt and used two basic samples: (1) a smaller sub-sample of women who ar e
d isproportionately likely to use welfare (the “restricted sample” ) and (2) a larger sample of all women
( the “unrestricted sample”).  The restricted  sample contains women age 20-44 with thirteen or fewer
years  of education.   The unrestricted  sample contains women age 16-59 of all educational levels.
10
  As Moffitt in dicates, a comparison of the two sets of estimates provides a specification test.  If the
e stimated coefficients for welfare benefits in the restricted sample are true , then they should be greater
in magnitude than those in the unrestricted sample.  
Table  6 contains estimates  of four different probit models which use unweighted data from
the   restricted sample.   In ea ch case, the dependent variable is equal to one if the woman is the lone
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head  of a census  family with one  or more children under 18 and zero otherwise.  Hence, this definition
includes  lone heads of “subfamilies”.  For the specifications in columns (3) and (4), the constan t
c orresponds to a woman age 20-24 with 10  or fewer years of schooling, residing in Ontario in 1981.
Th e sample means of the conditioning variables are presented in Table 1-A.  Column (5) illustrates
t he quantitative magnitude of  the coefficients in column (4) and will be explained below.  We report
on the results of a series of sensitivity tests after a discussion of the estimates in Table 6.17
Column   (1) contains the estimates of the simplest specification.  The welfare benefi t
co efficients  have the expected sign and t-ratios which exceed the standard threshold levels fo r
s tatistical significance.  These coefficients  imply that a $1,000 increase in the annual benefits for lone
mothers  (an  increase of approximately 8% in 1990-1993) would lead to a one percentage poin t
i ncrease in the proportion of wome n who were lone mothers from 12% to 13%.   A $1,000 increase
in  the annual  benefits for couples (an increase of approximately 7% in 1990-1993) would lead to a
0 .5 percentage point decrease in the proportion of women who are lone  mothers from 12% to 11.5%.
 These translate into modest elasticities of approximately 1.0 and -0.5 respectively.  
The model in column (2) adds a dummy variable for 11-13 years of schooling, the full-time
weekly earnin gs variables and a dummy variable for each sample year.  Both the coefficient and the
t-ratio   for the lone mother’s welfare benefits decline considerably in absolute value. The othe r
e stimates are as expec ted.  The dummy variable for women age 25-34 is now significantly negative.
A schoo ling level of 11-13 years, as opposed to 10 years or less, significantly lowers the likelihood
o f lone motherhood.  The female and  male earnings variables both have the expected signs and large
t-ratios.    The woman’s education and her potential wage have opposite and significant signs eve n
t hough the two variables are positi vely correlated.  There are several interpretations for the negative
c oefficient for education (controlling for wages).  For example, schooling ma y be positively correlated
with  knowledge about, and access to, more effective methods of  birth control.  The year dummies
generally indicate an upward trend.
Column  (3) presents the estimates of a model with  a fixed effect for each province.  In this
c ase, the welfare benefit v ariables take on unexpected signs, but they are not statistically significant.
This result is quite similar to Moffitt’ s, that is, the presence of a provincial fixed effect eliminates the18
expected   effect of welfare benefits. The addition of the fixed provincial effects does, however ,
increase (in absolute value) the coefficients for schooling, female earnings and male earnings.  
Many of the lone  mothers in our sample have been in that status for a number years prior to
t he survey and, therefore, one can make a case for lagging  the welfare benefits variables.  Column (4)
contains  the estimates of a model with provincial fixed effects and a  5-year lag in welfare benefits.
The  estimates in Columns (3) and (4) are quite similar to each other and to those (not shown here)
obtained with a 3-year lag in welfare benefits.   
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We use the final column to illus trate the quantitative magnitude of the coefficients in column
(4).   The first entry in column (5) is the sample proportion of lone mothers which is 0.10.  Th e
subsequent  ent ries use the coefficients in column (4) to show the impact of a switch in a dumm y
v ariable, a $1,000 increase in annual welfare benefits, and a 10 % increase in full-time weekly earnings
r espectively.  The entries for the age dummies show that,  when one controls for other socioeconomic
v ariables, the women age 25-34 and 35-44 ar e less likely than the youngest group (20-24) to be lone
mot hers  by approximately 6 percentage points and 7 percentage points respectively.   Changes i n
welfare  benefits have quantitatively very small and statistically non-significant effects.   The impact
of 11-13 years of schooling is to lower the likelihood of lone mothers from .10 to .04.
The  quantitative impacts of the  earnings variables are very large.  A ten percent increase in
f emale earnings is pr edicted to increase the proportion of women who are lone mothers from .10 to
. 20.  A ten percent increase in male earnings  is predict to decrease the proportion of women who are
l one mothers from .10  to .07.   The time trend, conditional on the values of the other variables, was
upwards   throughout the 1980's, but this was reversed in the recessionary years of the early 1990's.
The provinci al dummy variables generally have low t-ratios.  It is interesting to note, however, that19
t he predicted provincial differences in the incidence of lo ne motherhood in Table 6 are larger than the
o bserved provincial differenc es in Table 1-A.   The range of the unconditional provincial differences
i s fr om a low of .08 in PEI to a high of .12 in Nova Scotia, Ontario and Manitoba.  Controlling for
other variables, the predicted provincial differences range from a low of .07 in Quebec to a high of
.17 in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 
We have estimated a series of va riations on the basic model in order to assess the robustness
of  our findings.  One variation was to restrict the sample of lone mothers to heads of economi c
f amilies, i.e.,  exclude heads of subfamilies from the sample.    The resulting estimates in Table 3-A in
t he Appendix resemble those in Table 6 quite closely.   A second variation was to use the unrestricted
s ample, i.e., women age 16-59 fro m all schooling levels.  The resulting estimates in Table 4-A in the
Appendix are also ve ry similar to those in Table 6.  In particular, the likelihood of lone motherhood
declines significantly and monotonically with both age and education in both tables.  
One  reason f or using the restricted sample was as a specification test of the welfar e
c oefficients.  Moffitt noted that the estimated coefficients for welfare  benefits should, if they represent
a  t rue effect, be greater in magnitude in the restricted sample than in the unrestricted sample.  W e
h ave found, however, that the welfare benefi t coefficients are often of the unexpected sign and never
statistically significant in the presence of provincial fixed effects regardless of the sample used. 
We also used  several additional earnings measures.  The two alternative earnings measures
f or women were hourly wages and annual earnings among full yea r, full-time workers.  Each measure
invariably  had a significant, positive impact on the likelihood  of lone motherhood.  The magnitude
of these coefficients was usually smaller but within 25% of the female earnings coefficient in Table
6.   The principal alternative for men was  annual earnings among full year, full-time workers which20
yiel ded  a negative but, in some cases, non-significant coefficient.  We also used annual earning s
among all men with positive annual earnings and obtained similar results.  
Other   variations included the following:  the use of female and male earnings measure s
i mputed by OLS rather than the Heckman selection-correction proced ure; dropping the male earnings
variabl e;  and dropping both earnings variables (and including the unemployment rate and urba n
r esidence).  In none of the foregoing instances, did we obta in coefficients for the welfare benefits that
we re  both of the unexpected sign and statistically significant.  Furthermore, the coefficient an d
s tandard error estimates for female earnings ( when present),  age, education, year and province were
general ly  quite insensitive to these variations.  The only exception to this last sentence was th e
f ollowing.  When the male earnings vari able is dropped and urban residence is added to the headship
probit  (only the unemployment rate is excluded), then the female earnings coefficient is no t
significantly  different from zero and urban  residence has a strong positive coefficient.  Even in this
instance, however, the welfare benefit coefficients remain nonsignificant.
We noted in Section III that ours is a reduced  form model of the conditional probability of
l one  motherhood among all women, that is, we have not estimated separate models for marital and
child  stat us.  As a sensitivity test, however, we did estimate our basic model with a sample ever -
married women onl y, i.e., we excluded all never-married women both those with and those without
children.  The basic results are very similar to those in table 6.  
Another v ariation recommended by several early readers was to exclude the welfare benefit
f or two-parent families on the grounds that it played a small r ole in headship decisions and was highly
c orrelated (.9 0 in the full sample) with the welfare benefit for one-parent families.  We pursued this
suggestion  and found, once again, that the resulting estimates differed little from those in  Table 6.21
Recall  also  from Section III that the estimates in Table 6 changed little when we substituted th e
welfare benefits  for families with one child in place of the benefits for families with two children. 
A fin al test was to use data from the SCF economic family files.  As explained above, these
files  date back to 1973, but  were not used because they lack individual information for women are
n either the head nor the spouse of the head of an economic  family.  This problem is most pronounced
a mong women under age 25.  As a ch eck, we estimated our probit model using the economic family
file  data for a sample of  female heads and spouses of heads age 25 and over.  This effectively adds
four  more years  to our sample (1973, 1975,  1977 and 1979) because the public use files wer e
released every two years prior to 1981.   The resulting estimates are quite similar to those in Table
6 in sign, magnitude and statistical significance.22
V.   Summary and Conclusion
Our purpose in this paper has been to analyse the determinants  of the incidence of lone female
family  headship among Canadian women.   There is only a very small Canadian research literatur e
d espite strong recent concern with welfare reform.  Canada is si milar to the U.S. in the heavy reliance
of  lone mothers  on welfare income and in the recent weakness of the labour market for young ,
u ns killed workers.  The two countries differ in that Canada has no strictly demographic criteria for
welfare and has considerably higher benefit levels.  
Our  focus was on two sets of  independent variables:  the level of welfare benefits available
to  bot h lone-parent and two-parent families with children; and the earnings opportunities for bot h
women and their potential (male) partners.   We used data from the Individual Public Use Files of the
S urvey of Cons umer Finances for the years 1981, 1982 and 1984 through 1993 to estimate a series
of  probit func tions for the likelihood that a woman is a lone mother. A few of the simple r
sp ecifications  yielded coefficient estimates for welfare benefits for both lone mothers and couple s
which  wer e of modest size and statistical significance.  In any model with provincial fixed effects ,
h owever, the welfare benefit coeff icients were invariably small, statistically insignificant and often of
the   unexpected sign.  Hence, Allen’s (1993) finding with the 1986 Census public use sample of  a
l arge, positive assoc iation between the level of the welfare benefits and the likelihood that a woman
i s a lon e mother did not persist in a time-series of cross-sections with provincial fixed effects.  This
echoes Moffitt’s  (1994) results with U.S. data. 
All  three m easures of female earnings capacity (weekly, hourly, annual) did yield highl y
s ignificant, positive coefficients, a s expected, in all but one specification.  The predicted earnings for23
potential  (male) partners invariably yielded a negative coefficients but  the t-ratios were not always
a bove conventional threshold levels  in the case of annual, as opposed to weekly, measures.  We also
f ound that the likelihood of lone female headship had a very robust negative  relationship with the level
of a woman’s schooling and age. 
These central results held up un der using a variety of samples and model specifications.  The
i nciden ce of lone motherhood does appear to be sensitive to socioeconomic factors such as wages,
e duca tion and age.  However, our findings do not support the hypothesis that the level of available
welfare  benefi ts is an important determinant of the likelihood that a Canadian woman is a lon e
mother.    We hasten to add, however, that the Canadian literature on this topic is still at an earl y
s tage.  The eventual availability of multiple waves of data f rom the new longitudinal Canadian Survey
of   Labour and Income Dynamics will greatly improve our ability to assess the socioeconomi c
determinants of transitions into and out of various marital states. 
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Endnotes26
6.   Statistics Canada reports, and our own calculations confirm, that welfare income is under-
reported on the SCF.  The SCF estimates of aggregate "social assistance and provincial income
supplements" during the 1980's are about 65%-70% of the social assistance expenditures reported
by the provinces.  The measure of welfare participation in Table 3 is whether or not the person
received any SA income in the past year.  Dooley (1996) finds that under-reporting for this
variable appears to be less severe and is in the range of 85%-90%.  Furthermore,  the available
evidence indicates that the degree of under reporting appears to be fairly stable over time and
across family types.  Given stable measurement errors, the SCF data can measure accurately the
differences over time and across family types in the incidence of social assistance income.
7.  The SCF provides little information on this topic, but it does permit one to calculate the
proportion of persons who were out of the labour force for one or more weeks during the year
due to a disability. Among unmarried, childless women during our sample period, this proportion
was approximately 10% for those under age 35 and approximately 25% among those age 35-59.
8.  For each of our earnings measures, we excluded the self employed (whose reported
earnings usually include returns to both labour and capital) and unpaid family workers.  As a
further check for self employment and data consistency, we also exclude the small number of
observations with one of the following: negative earnings; positive earnings and zero weeks
worked; or zero earnings and positive weeks worked. 
9.  Additional federal and provincial cash transfers for families with children would add about
15% to the Canadian total package. Canadian welfare recipients also qualify for special drug and
other health benefits, subsidized day care and housing.
10. Moffitt used a sample of high school dropouts age 20-44.  The SCF data do not permit us
to distinguish clearly between high school graduates and dropouts.
11.  We estimated all of our models with both weighted and unweighted data and found that it
made little difference to either the coefficient or standard error estimates. 
12.  One can make a case for lagging the earnings variables.  All of our earnings data,
however, comes from the SCF itself unlike the welfare benefits data.  In order to lag the earnings
measures, we would have to shorten the length of what is not an overly long (14 years) time-
series.27
Table 1
Incidence of Lone Motherhood 
Proportion of Women Who Are Lone Mothers
 a
1981-1985 1986-1989 1990-1993
Age 16-24 .04 .03 .04
Age 25-34 .08 .08 .09
Age 35-44 .10 .08 .10
Age 45-59 .04 .03 .03
Total .06 .06 .07
Proportion of Mothers   Who Are Lone Mothers 
b
Age 16-25 .24 .26 .36
Age 25-34 .12 .13 .15
Age 35-44 .13 .11 .14
Age 45-59 .13 .15 .14
Total .14 .13 .16
Proportion of Lone Mothers Who Head Economic Families   
c
Age 16-25 .71 .74 .74
Age 25-34 .91 .89 .88
Age 35-44 .96 .95 .95
Age 45-59 .97 .98 .94
Total .90 .90 .90
  Head of Census Family with one or more children under 18.  A census  family just includes parents
a
and their never married children.  
  Head or Spouse of Head of Census Family with one or more children under 18.
b
An economic family includes all related persons living in the same household.  
c 28
Table 1-A
Variable Means - Restricted Sample
Proportion of Women Who Are Lone Mothers .11
Proportion of Women Age 20-24 .18
Proportion of Women Age 25-34 .42
Proportion of Women Age 35-44 .39
Welfare Benefit for Lone Parent with Two Children 11,279
Welfare Benefit for Couple with Two Children 12,624
Mother’s Education, Grade 10 or less .43
Mother’s Education, Grade 11-13 .57
Ln of Women’s Full Time Weekly Earnings 5.67
Ln of (Male) Partner’s Full Time Weekly Earnings 6.12





New Brunswick .11 .10






British Columbia .10 .1029
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of Lone Mothers
1981-1985 1986-1989 1990-1993
Age Distribution of Lone Mothers 
Age 16-24 .15 .13 .13
Age 25-34 .36 .39 .38
Age 35-44 .34 .35 .38
Age 45-59 .14 .14 .11
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Age Distribution of All Women 
Age 16-25 .26 .22 .20
Age 25-34 .28 .30 .28
Age 35-44 .22 .25 .26
Age 45-59 .24 .24 .26
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Proportion of Lone Mothers Who Are Never Married
Age 16-25 .67 .72 .77
Age 25-34 .22 .34 .41
Age 35-44 .06 .10 .12
Age 45-59 .03 .02 .05
Total .23 .27 .3230
Table 2-A






Age 25-34 .24 .20
(35.2) (40.3)
Age 35-44 .35 .33
(51.6) (64.5)
Age 45-59 .41 .41
(59.1) (49.1)
Education: Grade 11-13 .14 .07
(17.9) (11.7)
Education:  Some Postsecondary Education  .21 .10
(23.9) (14.2)
Education:  Postsecondary Diploma or Certificate .33 .12
(36.3) (17.3)

























Urban Area:  dummy variable equal to 1 if city has .08 .06
population > 100,000.  (17.2) (21.2)






New Brunswick -.14 -.09
(10.1) (11.8)










British Columbia .001 .04
(0.1) (7.4)
Selection Term -.18 -.43
(12.7) (10.4)
 The sample has 86,739 observations on women age 16-59. The parentheses contain the t-ratios. This
a
was estimated using Heckman’s (1987) correction for sample selection.  The probit function for
selection into the earnings regression contained the above variables plus the following three:  the number
of children under age 18; the presence of a child under 7; and the average of the level of welfare benefits
for a lone mother with two children and the level of welfare benefits for a couple with two children. 
 The sample has 184,536 observations on couples in which the wife is age 16-59.  This regression was
a
estimated with the same methods as those used for the female earnings regression. 32
Table 3
Incidence of Social Assistance Income 
1981-1985 1986-1989 1990-1993
Proportion of Lone Mothers Who Report Social Assistance Income 
Age 16-24 .58 .56 .66
Age 25-34 .42 .43 .52
Age 35-44 .27 .26 .33
Age 45-59 .32 .23 .29
Total .38 .36 .44
Proportion of Couples With Children Who Report Social Assistance Income 
Age 16-25 .05 .05 .10
Age 25-34 .02 .02 .03
Age 35-44 .01 .01 .01
Age 45-59 .01 .01 .02
Total .02 .02 .02
Proportion of Unmarried, Childless Women Who Report Social Assistance Income 
Age 16-25 .03 .03 .03
Age 25-34 .06 .06 .09
Age 35-44 .12 .14 .14
Age 45-59 .17 .16 .19
Total .06 .07 .0833
Table 3-A
Probit Estimates for Economic Family Headship
a
Restricted Sample    with Full-TimeWeekly Wages
b
(1)  (2)  (3)
Fixed Effect
Constant -1.86 -9.2 -11.8
(29.5) (16.4) (4.0)
Age 25-34 .09 -.25 -.39
(4.3) (8.1) (3.7)
Age 35-44 .03 -.42 -.48
(1.2) (11.1) (2.9)
Welfare Benefit for Lone Parent with .06 .01 -.03
Two Children (000's/year) (5.4) (.4) (.9)
Welfare Benefit for Two Parent with -.01 -.01 .02
Two Children (000's/year) (1.0) (.7) (.8)
Education: Grade 11-13 -.45 -.49
(18.8) (5.4)
Female Ln Weekly Full-Time Earnings 2.15 4.9
(10.6) (14.9)
Potential Male Partner’s Ln Weekly Full- -.64 -2.7










































 This definition is restricted to lone female heads of economic families who live with one or more own
a
children under 18.  Lone heads of “secondary census families” or “subfamilies” are excluded from the
sample.   Economic  families include all related persons in a household.
 The sample has  52,085  observations on women age  20-44 with 13 years or less years of
b
schooling.  The parentheses contain the t-ratios35
Table 4
Average Full-Time Weekly Earnings (1986$)
1981-1985 1986-1989 1990-1993
Women 
Age 16-24 276 273 277
Age 25-34 379 376 386
Age 35-44  397 413 431
Age 45-59 380 397 427
Total 357 370 394
Men 
Age 16-25 347 324 329
Age 25-34 534 516 510
Age 35-44 647 654 632
Age 45-59 666 666 674
Total 551 557 56636
Table 4-A
Probit Estimates for Lone (Census Family) Headship   
a
Unrestricted Sample   with Full-Time Weekly Wages
b




Constant -1.68 -5.2 -12.0 .07
(48.7) (13.3) (4.2)
Age 25-34 .31 .15 -.23 .04
(23.6) (7.1) (4.5)
Age 35-44 .34 .09 -.43 .03
(25.9) (3.1) (4.1)
Age 45-59 -.21 -.55 -1.1 .01
(13.3) (16.8) (7.6)
Welfare Benefit for Lone Parent with Two .01 -.02 -.03 .07
Children (000's/year) (0.6) (2.3) (1.7)
Welfare Benefit for Two Parent with Two -.01 -.01 .02 .07
Children (000's/year) (.4) (.4) (1.4)
Education: Grade 11-13 -.34 -.66 .02
(18.1) (17.0)
Education:  Some Postsecondary Education  -.44 -.92 .01
(17.0) (15.3)
Education:  Postsecondary Diploma or -.65 -1.5 .00
Certificate (15.6) (10.8)
Education:  University Degree -1.2 -2.8 .00
(14.5) (10.3)
Female Ln Weekly Full-Time Earnings1.2 4.1 .14
(6.8) (5.2)
Potential Male Partner’s Ln Weekly Full-Time -.39 -1.9 .05
Earnings (2.2) (1.7)
1982 .04 .06 .08
(1.7) (2.3)
1984 .11 .20 .10
(4.8) (7.9)
1985 .14 .26 .11
(5.8) (9.2)
1986 .15 .27 .11
(6.2) (10.6)37
Table 4-A (continued)
1987 .17 .35 .13
(7.1) (10.9)
1988 .21 .39 .14
(8.2) (9.6)
1989 .24 .49 .16
(9.1) (9.6)
1990 .26 .45 .15
(10.3) (13.1)
1991 .23 .31 .12
(9.2) (10.7)
1992 .29 .39 .14
(11.5) (12.7)






New Brunswick .44 .15
(10.1)










British Columbia .14 .09
(3.4)
 Census families include only a lone adult or couple and their never married children. Hence, this
a
definition includes lone heads of “secondary census families” or “subfamilies”. 
 The sample has 185,124 observations on women age 16-59. The parentheses contain the t-ratios.
b
 The first entry in this column is the sample proportion (.07).  The subsequent entries use the
c
coefficients in column (4) to show the impact of a switch in a dummy variable, a $1,000 increase in




Average Weekly Benefits 
One Parent with Two Children 207 223 245
Couple with Two Children 229 250 275
One Parent/Couple  .90 .89 .89
Average Weekly Benefits/Full Time Weekly Earnings
One Parent/Female 16-24 .75 .82 .88
One Parent/Female 25-34 .55 .59 .63
One Parent/Female 16-59 .58 .60 .62
Couple/Male 16-24 .66 .77 .84
Couple/Male 16-24 .43 .48 .54
Couple/Male 16-59 .42 .45 .4939
Table 6
Probit Estimates for Lone (Census Family) Headship   
a
Restricted Sample   with Full-Time Weekly Wages
b
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
Simple Time Fixed Welfare Conditional
Trends Effect 5 year lag Probability
c
Constant -1.64 -7.3 -12.0 -12.6 .10
(27.0)(13.8) (4.2) (4.1)
Age 25-34 .02 -.27 -.47 -.48 .04
(.8) (9.0) (4.7) (4.6)
Age 35-44 -.07 -.44 -.62 -.64 .03
(3.6) (12.1) (3.9) (3.8)
Welfare Benefit for Lone Parent .06 .02 -.05 .03 .11
with Two Children (000's/year) (6.3) (1.7) (1.5) (.8)
Welfare Benefit for Two Parent -.02 -.02 .03 -.01 .10
with Two Children (000's/year) (2.5) (2.1) (1.5) (.5)
Education: Grade 11-13 -.40 -.51 -.52 .04
(17.7) (5.8) (5.6)
Female Ln Weekly Full-Time 2.04 4.4 4.4 .20
Earnings (10.4)(14.1) (13.5)
Potential Male Partner’s Ln -.83 -2.2 -2.1 .07
Weekly Full-Time Earnings (4.9) (3.3) (2.9)
1982 .04 .04 .03 .11
(1.2) (.7) (.5)
1984 .09 .11 .09 .12
(2.7) (2.0) (1.6)
1985 .18 .25 .22 .14
(5.2) (4.7) (4.1)
1986 .17 .21 .19 .14
(4.6) (3.0) (2.5)
1987 .19 .29 .26 .15
(5.6) (4.6) (4.0)
1988 .29 .43 .39 .19
(8.2) (7.7) (6.8)40
Table 6 (continued)
1989 .42 .63 .58 .24
(10.2)(11.4) (10.2)
1990 .40 .51 .47 .21
(9.8) (6.9) (6.4)
1991 .23 .16 .12 .12
(4.7) (1.3) (1.0)
1992 .34 .35 .30 .16
(6.9) (3.2) (2.8)
1993 .22 .02 -.03 .10
(3.9) (.2) (.2)
Nfld. -.13 -.06 .09
(1.2) (.4)
PEI -.27 -.15 .08
(1.4) (.7)
New Brunswick .22 .31 .17
(2.2) (2.5)
Nova Scotia .29 .32 .17
(2.9) (2.9)
Quebec -.28 -.17 .07
(3.7) (1.7)
Manitoba .02 .18 .14
(.2) (1.7)
Saskatchewan .15 .21 .14
(2.2) (2.7)
Alberta -.08 .02 .10
(1.5) (.2)
British Columbia -.04 -.02 .10
(1.0) (.4)
 Census families include only a lone adult or couple and their never married children. Hence, this
a
definition includes lone heads of “secondary census families” or “subfamilies”. 
 The sample has 52,709 observations on women age 20-44 with 13 years of schooling or less.  The
b
parentheses contain the t-ratios.
 The first entry in this column is the sample proportion (0.10).  The subsequent entries use the
c
coefficients in column (4) to show the predicted probability that a women is a lone mother given a switch
in a dummy variable, a $1,000 increase in annual welfare benefits or a 10% increase in full-time weekly
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